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ABSTRACT
In Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd., the Federal Circuit held that actions taken outside the
United States might make a foreign defendant liable for induced infringement of a US
patent under § 271(b) of the Patent Act. This article questions whether Merial remains
good law after the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in WesternGECO LLC v. ION
Geophysical Corp. There, the Supreme Court held that lost profits from foreign sales
were recoverable under § 284 of the Patent Act when they resulted from acts of
domestic patent infringement. In reaching that decision, the Court applied the test
from RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community to evaluate the potential
extraterritorial application of US patent laws. If the same test from RJR Nabisco is
applied to § 271(b), an accused infringer who acts entirely outside the United States
should not be liable for inducing infringement of a U.S. patent. In other words, this
article concludes that Merial has been overruled by implication.
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EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND THE ACTIVE INDUCEMENT OF INFRINGEMENT
ROBERT H. STIER, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose a Chinese component manufacturer produces a device that, if made in
the United States, would infringe a U.S. patent. It sells the product in China to another
company that incorporates the component into a consumer product that it intends to
import into the United States. Can the component manufacturer be liable for active
inducement of infringement if it makes the overseas sale knowing that the component
is patented and that its customer will import the product into the United States?
In Merial Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd.,1 the Federal Circuit held that actions taken outside
the United States might constitute induced infringement under § 271(b) of the Patent
Act. This paper questions whether Merial remains good law after the Supreme Court’s
2018 decision in WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.2 There, the Supreme
Court held that lost profits from foreign sales were recoverable under § 284 of the
Patent Act when they resulted from acts of domestic patent infringement.3 In reaching
that decision, the Court applied the test from RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European
Community4 to evaluate the potential extraterritorial application of US patent laws.
For the reasons set forth below, if the same test from RJR Nabisco is applied to
§ 271(b), an accused infringer who acts entirely outside the United States should not
be liable for inducing infringement of a U.S. patent. In other words, this paper
concludes that Merial has been impliedly overruled.
Producers today compete in a global economy, but the rules governing competition
are still primarily nation-centric. While patent laws have been harmonized through
treaties–the Patent Cooperation Treaty being perhaps the best example–patents are
still granted and enforced by individual countries. The issue considered here is how far
the United States can go in enforcing its patent laws against foreign competitors.5
In the United States, it is well-established that patents are only directly infringed
by actions that take place inside the borders of this country: making, using, selling,
offering to sell or importing a product covered by a U.S. patent.6 Even § 271(g), which
concerns products manufactured abroad using a process patented in the United States,
* © 2020 Robert H. Stier, Jr. Partner, Pierce Atwood LLP, Portland, Maine; Boston,
Massachusetts; and Stockholm, Sweden.
1 681 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012). See 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012) (“Whoever actively induces
infringement shall be liable as an infringer.”).
2 138 S.Ct. 2129 (2018).
3 Id. at 2139.
4 136 S.Ct. 2090 (2016).
5 For other thoughtful comments on this issue generally, see, e.g., Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec,
Infringement, Unbound, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 117 (2018); Yaad Rotem, Economic Regulation and
the Presumption against Extraterritoriality—A New Justification, 3 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 229
(2012); Dariush Keyhani, Patent Law in the Global Economy: A Modest Proposal for U.S. Patent Law
and Infringement without Borders, 54 VILL. L. REV. 291 (2009); Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial
Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 505 (1997).
6 See, e.g., Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1914); Microsoft
Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007).
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is invoked only when such products are imported into the United States. But the patent
laws also prohibit indirect infringement by those who contribute to infringement by
selling or importing a component especially made for an infringement, or by those who
actively induce the direct infringement by others. Our focus here is on foreign actors
whose activities–entirely outside the United States–are alleged to induce third-parties
to infringe, for example, by importing products covered by U.S. patents.
We will explore this issue first in the context of the law governing active
inducement of infringement, particularly as explicated by the Supreme Court in
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.7 Next, we will review the current state of the
law as set forth by the Federal Circuit in Merial v. Cipla.8 Then we will consider two
recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the extraterritorial application of United
States laws. Finally, we will examine the impact of the Court’s test for
extraterritoriality on the continued viability of the Merial decision, with attention
directed to a recent Federal Circuit decision which the Supreme Court declined to
review.
A. The fundamentally territorial nature of U.S. patent law
In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp.,9 the Supreme Court reiterated a principle first
stated in 1857 that:
[o]ur patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect; these acts of
Congress do not, and were not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the
United States; and we correspondingly reject the claims of others to such
control over our markets.10
Absent “a clear congressional indication of intent,” United States courts had no
authority to stop the manufacture and sale of the parts of patented inventions for
assembly and use abroad.11
In Microsoft, the Court emphasized that the presumption against
extraterritoriality “applies with particular force in patent law.”12 In Deepsouth, the
Court noted that: “Our patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect”; our
legislation “do[es] not, and [was] not intended to, operate beyond the limits of the
United States, and we correspondingly reject the claims of others to such control over
our markets.”13
“In short, foreign law alone, not United States law, currently governs the
manufacture and sale of components of patented inventions in foreign countries.”14

563 U.S. 754 (2011).
681 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
9 550 U.S. 437 (2007)
10 Id. at 444 (citing Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) and Brown
v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 195, 15 L.Ed. 595 (1857)).
11 Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 444 (2007).
12 Id. at 454-455.
13 Deepsouth Packing, 406 U.S., at 531 (quoting Brown, 19 How. at 195, 15 L.Ed. 595)).
14 Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 456.
7
8
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B. Active inducement of infringement: Global-Tech
The Supreme Court weighed in on the test for proving active inducement of
infringement in Global-Tech. Although it did not reach the particular issue that
concerns us here, the decision establishes the essential context for all cases involving
active inducement of infringement.
In Global-Tech, the plaintiff SEB, a French company, held U.S. Patent No.
4,995,312 which covered a deep fryer cooking appliance with a well-insulated outer
shell.15 Because it remained cool to the touch, the fryer’s outer shell could be made of
inexpensive plastic.16 SEB sued a Hong Kong company, Pentalpha Enterprises, and its
parent British Virgin Islands corporation, Global-Tech Appliances, for making and
selling similar deep fryers with “cool touch” features.17 Pentalpha had purchased an
SEB deep fryer and had copied its patented features.18 Pentalpha sold the accused deep
fryers to Sunbeam, Fingerhut and Montgomery Ward, and the three customers then
imported and sold the accused fryers in the United States under their own marks.19
After Sunbeam settled a separate patent infringement suit for $2 million, SEB
sued Montgomery Ward and its suppliers, Pentalpha and Global-Tech.20 The claim
against Montgomery Ward was stayed because the company was in bankruptcy.21
Pentalpha moved for summary judgment that it did not directly infringe,
contending that it manufactured the accused fryers in Hong Kong and sold them f.o.b.
China.22 The district court denied summary judgment, noting that Pentalpha
negotiated the sales through a U.S. sales representative, justifying the inference that
an offer for sale was made in the United States.23 The court also rejected defendants’
argument that the “free on board China” commercial term of the sales was dispositive,
especially where Pentalpha itself had shipped the fryers to the United States.24
The case proceeded to trial and the jury found defendants liable both for directly
infringing claim 1 of the ‘312 patent and for actively inducing others’ infringement of
that same claim.25 The district court reduced the $4.65 million damage award posttrial by $2 million to offset the settlement paid by Sunbeam.26
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concluded that the record was unclear about which
liability theory—direct infringement or active inducement of infringement—supported
the jury’s damage award.27 Thus, to avoid remanding for a new trial, it had to
determine whether both theories were supported by the evidence.28 It concluded that
they were.

SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 594 F.3d 1360, 1365 (2010).
Id.
17 Id. at 1366.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1366-67.
21 SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 137 F.Supp.2d 285, 286 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
22 SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 412 F.Supp.2d 336, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
23 Id. at 340-43.
24 Id. at 342-43.
25 SEB, 594 F.3d at 1367-68.
26 Id. at 1368.
27 Id. at 1374.
28 Id.
15
16
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Considering first the evidence of direct infringement, the Federal Circuit noted
that Pentalpha had sold the accused fryers f.o.b. Hong Kong or mainland China, but
restated its comment from Litecubes, LLC v. N. Light Prods., Inc.,29 that it “rejected
the notion that simply because goods were shipped f.o.b., the location of the ‘sale’ for
the purposes of § 271 must be the location from which the goods were shipped.”30 The
court found no error in the instruction allowing the jury to consider “where the
products were shipped from and where the products were shipped to.”31 Evidence
supporting the verdict included Pentalpha’s application of American trademarks to the
fryers, its manufacture of fryers for U.S. electrical connections, and invoices calling for
the delivery of fryers to destinations in the U.S.32
On the issue of active inducement of infringement, Pentalpha defended on the
ground that it had no actual knowledge of the ‘312 patent.33 The Federal Circuit ruled
that deliberate indifference to a known risk was sufficient to hold Pentalpha liable for
active inducement.34 The court noted that its ruling “does not purport to establish the
outer limits of the type of knowledge needed for inducement.”35 Thus, the court
concluded that the damage award would stand even if it were only based on the jury
finding of active inducement.36
In their petition for a Writ of Certiorari, defendants framed the issue as:
Whether the legal standard for the state of mind element of a claim for
actively inducing infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) is “deliberate
indifference of a known risk” that an infringement may occur, as the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held, or “purposeful, culpable expression and
conduct” to encourage an infringement, as this Court taught in MGM
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 937, 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2780, 162
L. Ed. 2d 781, 801 (2005)?37
Thus, the Supreme Court was never asked to review the jury’s determination of
direct infringement, only its verdict on active inducement.
The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s test of “deliberate indifference
to a known risk,” concluding that induced infringement “requires knowledge that the
induced acts constitute patent infringement.”38 The Court upheld the judgment,
however, applying a theory of willful blindness.39 To show willful blindness, a patent
holder must prove that the accused infringer subjectively believed that there was a
high probability that a fact exists and that it took deliberate actions to avoid learning
of that fact.40
523 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
SEB S.A., 594 F.3d at 1375 (citing Litecubes, 523 F.3d at 1370).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 1376.
34 Id. at 1377
35 Id. at 1378.
36 Id. at 1378.
37 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 2010 WL 2813550 (June 23, 2010).
38 Global-Tech Appliances, 563 U.S. at 759-66.
39 Id. at 766-771.
40 Id. at 769
29
30
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The test for willful blindness was thus more stringent than the Federal Circuit’s
test in two respects. First, a known risk is not enough. Instead, the accused infringer
must believe it is highly likely that, for example, a patent exists that covers the accused
product. Second, the accused infringer must take deliberate steps “to avoid knowing
about the infringing nature of the activities.”41
C. Active inducement by foreign acts: Merial
A year after the Global-Tech decision, the Federal Circuit decided Merial Ltd. v.
Cipla Ltd..42 There, the Federal Circuit held for the first time that section 271(b) “does
not, on its face, foreclose liability for extraterritorial acts that actively induce an act of
direct infringement that occurs within the United States.”43 According to the Federal
Circuit, extraterritorial acts that induce infringement are “not categorically exempt
from redress under § 271(b).”44 To support its position, the court recited with approval
a jury instruction from DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co.45 stating that “induced
infringement does not require any activity by the indirect infringer in this country, so
long as the direct infringement occurs here.”46 Before Merial, a number of district
courts had reached the same conclusion.47
Merial involved an appeal from a contempt finding. The patents-in-suit covered
compositions marketed under the Frontline Plus trademark that protect dogs and cats
from fleas and ticks.48 Merial sued Cipla, an Indian company, for infringement.49 Cipla
did not respond and the court entered an injunction barring it from infringing the
patents-in-suit.50
Some former Merial executives then started a competing veterinary
pharmaceutical company, Velcera, and later arranged, through a series of
intermediate corporate entities, to acquire infringing compositions from Cipla.51 The
products were sold by Cipla to a third-party intermediary in India, and they were then
sent to another intermediary in Dubai, from which they were then imported into the
United States.52

Id. at 770.
681 F.3d 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
43 Id. at 1302.
44 Id. at 1302-03.
45 471 F.3d 1293, 1305-06 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
46 Id. at 1303.
47 See, e.g., Honeywell Intern. Inc. v. Acer America Corp., 655 F.Supp.2d 650, 658-59 (E.D. Tex.
2009); Wing Shing Products (BVI), Ltd. v. Simatelex Manufactory Co., 479 F.Supp.2d 388, 410
(S.D.N.Y.2007); C. Van der Lely N.V. v. F. lli Maschio S.n.c., 222 U.S.P.Q. 399, 430 (S.D.Ohio 1984);
MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., No. C 01–4925, 2006 WL 463525
at *7 (N.D.Cal. Feb. 24, 2006).
48 Merial, 681 F.3d at 1288.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1288-89.
51 Id. at 1289-91.
52 Id. at 1291.
41
42
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Merial moved for contempt against Cipla, alleging a violation of the court’s
permanent injunction.53 Velcera intervened and was joined as a defendant.54 Cipla
asserted that the injunction was void because the district court had lacked personal
jurisdiction against it.55 The court disagreed, found the defendants in contempt and
enjoined both from making, using, selling or importing veterinary products containing
certain key ingredients.56 The defendants appealed from the judgment of contempt.57
Cipla argued on appeal that the court had improperly punished conduct that
occurred entirely overseas.58 The Federal Circuit agreed that direct infringement only
covers conduct within the United States, but it distinguished active inducement of
infringement under § 271(b).59 The Federal Circuit explained that it simply declined
to read a limitation into the statute that was not expressly stated, namely, that
entirely extraterritorial acts cannot actively induce infringement.60
The Federal Circuit also referenced its decision in DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co.,61
where it had approved a jury instruction that stated: “Unlike direct infringement,
which must take place within the United States, induced infringement does not require
any activity by the indirect infringer in this country, as long as the direct infringement
occurs here.”62 The holding in DSU was independent of this proposition; moreover, the
parties had not disputed this issue on appeal, so the single sentence in the instruction
had limited, if any, precedential value.63
Applying Global-Tech, the key facts supporting liability against Cipla for active
inducement were: (1) Cipla was aware of the patent that was allegedly infringed and
of the injunction; (2) Cipla “played fundamental roles in manufacturing, packaging,
and assisting in the development of the accused product;” (3) Cipla knew that the
accused product was to be sold in the United States; and (4) Cipla knew and intended
that the U.S. sales would infringe the asserted patent.64 Despite the formal
independent legal relationships of the intermediary companies, the district court found
that Velcera had acted in active concert with Cipla in arranging for the importation of
the accused product: “Clever lawyers cannot shield the true substance of the
contumacious conduct, no matter how many different entities attempt to launder
Cipla’s fingerprints off the product.”65
Since 2012, courts have relied on Merial for the proposition that accused
infringers may be liable for induced infringement “where a foreign party, with the
requisite knowledge and intent, employs extraterritorial means to actively induce acts
Merial, 681 F.3d at 1291-92.
Id. at 1292.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Merial, 681 F.3d at 1302.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1302-03.
61 DSU, 471 F.3d at 1293.
62 Merial, 681 F.3d at 1305.
63 In DSU, defendants had contested the imposition of liability under 271(b) for extraterritorial
acts, but as plaintiffs noted in a bench memorandum, the trial court had resolved that issue against
defendants in a series of pretrial orders and in jury instructions. See, e.g., DSU Medical Corp. v JMS
Co., Ltd., 2004 WL 5565946 (N.D. Cal. March 26, 2004).
64 Merial, 681 F.3d at 1304.
65 Id. at 1305.
53
54
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of direct infringement that occur within the United States.”66 This proposition has not
been subject to any serious questioning.67
Similarly, commentators have recognized that in Merial, the Federal Circuit “has
provided some extraterritorial reach” to § 271(b).68 Again, none of the commentators
have suggested that Merial was incorrectly decided.
D. Extraterritoriality after 2012: RJR Nabisco
After the Federal Circuit decided Merial in 2012, the Supreme Court significantly
refined the test for extraterritoriality. Under this test, there is serious reason to
question the continuing viability of Merial’s proposition that purely extraterritorial
acts will support liability for active inducement of infringement.
RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community,69 involved a civil Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) suit by the European Community and
26 of its member states against RJR Nabisco and related entities alleging participation
in a global money laundering scheme involving drug traffickers who used the profits
from smuggled narcotics to pay for large shipments of cigarettes into Europe.70 The
issue was whether RICO has extraterritorial application.71 The Court held that the

66 See, e.g., Asia Vital Components Co., Ltd. v. Asekek Danmark A/S, 377 F.Supp.3d 990, 1023
(N.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting Merial, 681 F.3d at 1302). See also, Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul
Semiconductor Co., Ltd., 909 F.3d 398, 408 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Semcon IP Inc. v. Kyocera Corp., 2019
WL 1979930 at *3-4 (E.D. Tex. 2019).
67 Although the Federal Circuit did not cite Merial or directly address the issue of
extraterritoriality, the facts presented might have supported an argument against active inducement
of infringement in Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 843 F.3d 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Fairchild was accused of taking affirmative acts to induce third parties to import infringing
devices into the United States where it sold all of its products into a worldwide distribution system
with no knowledge where they will end up. Id. at 1333. Evidence supporting active inducement
included designing chips to meet U.S. energy standards and competing for business that was directed
to the United States, activities consistent with extraterritorial conduct. Id. But the court also cited
evidence more directly relating to domestic conduct such as providing demonstration boards
containing infringing chips to customers and potential customers in the United States and
maintaining a technical support center in the United States for domestic customers that had
infringing devices. Id. at 1333-34. Thus, at least some of the acts of alleged inducement appear not to
have been extraterritorial.
68 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae for Law Professor Timothy R. Holbrook in Support of Petitioners
at *7, Epic Systems Corp. v. McKesson Technologies, Inc., 2013 WL 494169 (2013). See also, Brief
Amici Curiae of Ten Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of Petitioner on the Issue of
Extraterritoriality at *7-8, Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 2014 WL 689554
(2014); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Potential Extraterritorial Consequences of Akamai, 26 EMORY INT’L
L. REV. 499 (2012) [hereinafter Holbrook, Potential Extraterritorial]; Marketa Trimble, Advancing
National Intellectual Property Policies in a Transnational Context, 74 MD. L. REV. 203, 214-216 (2015);
Bernard Chao, Patent Imperialism, 109 NW. U.L. REV. 77, 79 (2014); Timothy R. Holbrook,
Boundaries, Extraterritoriality, and Patent Infringement Damages, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1745,
1763-64 (2017); Michael Brody et al., Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Patent Laws, 18 SEDONA
CONF. J. 187, 201 (2017).
69 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016)
70 Id. at 2098.
71 Id. at 2099

[19:204 2020] Extraterritoriality and the Active Inducement of Infringement

211

private right of action under RICO does not reach injuries abroad, but applies only to
domestic injuries to business or property.72 As a result, the claims were dismissed.73
The Supreme Court articulated a two-part test for analyzing extraterritoriality
issues.74 First, has the presumption against extraterritoriality been rebutted? Or, as
Justice Scalia phrased the issue: “whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative
indication that it applies extraterritorially.”75 The Court did not mince words: “[a]bsent
clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed
to have only domestic application.”76 This first step requires that Congress “has
affirmatively and unmistakably instructed that the statute” applies to foreign
conduct.77
If the statute is not expressly extraterritorial, “at the second step we determine
whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute, and we do this by
looking to the statute’s ‘focus.’ If the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in
the United States, then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if
other conduct occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus occurred in a
foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial application
regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.”78
In RJR Nabisco, the Court applied the test separately to individual sections of the
RICO statute: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), (b), (c) and (d) and to § 1964(c).79 It found that the
predicate acts identified in §§ 1962 (b) and (c)—prohibiting employment of a pattern of
racketeering—might apply to extraterritorial conduct, but that the private right of
action in § 1964(c) did not cover foreign injuries.80
E. Extraterritoriality applied to patent law: WesternGeco
Two years after RJR Nabisco, the Supreme Court applied its test for
extraterritoriality in the context of a patent dispute. In WesternGeco LLC v. ION
Geophysical Corp.81 the Court considered whether lost profit damages for domestic
infringement might include lost sales abroad under § 284 of the Patent Act.82

Id. at 2106-11.
Id. at 2111.
74 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101. The RJR Nabisco test derives from two other
extraterritoriality decisions: Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd, 561 U.S. 247 (2010) and Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). In Morrison, Justice Scalia rejected the Second
Circuit’s longstanding “conducts and effects” approach to extraterritoriality issues in the context of
securities fraud cases. In its place, the Court proposed that the statute be interpreted according to the
‘focus’ of congressional concern. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266. Kiobel extended that extraterritoriality
analysis to the Alien Tort Statute. See Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 126 (Alito, J., concurring).
75 RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
76 Id. at 2100.
77 Id. (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261).
78 Id. at 2101.
79 Id. at 2101-11
80 Id. at 2111.
81 WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129 (2018).
82 Id. at 2134.
72
73
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WesternGeco owned patents covering a system for surveying the ocean floor using
novel lateral-steering technology.83 Defendant ION Geophysical began selling a
competing system where the components were made in the United States and shipped
to companies abroad who assembled the components into a system covered by the
patents.84 WesternGeco sued ION, alleging infringement under § 271(f)(2) for the
exportation of components specially adapted for use in the patented invention.85 The
jury awarded $93.4 million in lost profits on ten foreign survey contracts that
WesternGeco allegedly lost because of the infringement.86 The issue on appeal was
whether § 284 of the Patent Act prohibits the recovery of lost profits on such foreign
sales because it constitutes an extraterritorial application of the statute.87
WesternGeco argued that the presumption against extraterritoriality should
never be applied to a general damages statute.88 To avoid a ruling that might apply
broadly to other damages issues in other contexts not under consideration, the Court
reversed the order of the analysis and began with the second step of the analytical
framework, identifying the focus of the statute to determine whether the case involves
a domestic application of the statute.89
The Court explained that “[w]hen determining the focus of a statute, we do not
analyze the provision at issue in a vacuum . . . If the statutory provision at issue works
in tandem with other provisions, it must be assessed in concert with those other
provisions.”90 The Court concluded that “the infringement” is the focus of § 284 and
explained that “the ‘overriding purpose’ of § 284 is to ‘affor[d] patent owners’ complete
‘compensation’ for infringement”.91 Thus, to determine the focus of § 284 in a specific
case requires the Court to address whether the infringing conduct involves domestic
or foreign acts.92
In this instance, the Court noted that the infringing conduct corresponds to §
271(f)(2), which “focuses on domestic conduct,”93 because the “conduct that § 271(f)(2)
regulates—i.e., its focus—is the domestic act of ‘supply[ying] in or from the United
States.’”94

WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2135.
Id.
85 Id. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (2018) (“Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be
supplied in or from the United States any component of a patented invention that is especially made
or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is uncombined in whole or in part,
knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such component will be
combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer”).
86 Id.
87 Id. at 2135-36.
88 Id. at 2136-37.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 2137, (internal citation omitted)
91 Id. Section 284 reads, in pertinent part: “Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award
the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs
as fixed by the court.” 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2018).
92 WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct at 2137.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 2138.
83
84
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Thus, the Court concluded that “the focus of § 284, in a case involving
infringement under § 271(f)(2), is on the act of exporting components from the United
States.”95 Accordingly, “the lost-profits damages that were awarded to WesternGeco
were a domestic application of § 284.”96
In responding to arguments from ION, the Court elaborated on the determination
of a statute’s focus. The focus is not necessarily what a statute authorizes (e.g., an
award of damages), but is instead “‘the objec[t] of the statute’s solicitude’—which can
turn on the ‘conduct,’ ‘parties,’ or interests that it regulates or protects.”97 The Court
noted the Federal Circuit’s acknowledgment that § 271(f)(2) protects against domestic
entities who export components from the United States.98
F. Extraterritoriality applied to § 271(b)
To extend the extraterritoriality analysis to active inducement of infringement
under § 271(b), we can imagine a hypothetical situation where an accused foreign
company manufactures products that clearly fall within the scope of a competitor’s
U.S. patent claims. We can assume further that the accused infringer knows of the
patent and believes that its products would be infringing if made in the United States,
but there is no foreign patent covering the manufacture of the products. The products
are sold abroad to an independent foreign middleman who then arranges to import the
accused products to distributors in the United States. Finally, assume that the foreign
manufacturer was also aware that the accused products would be imported into and
sold in the United States. Under these circumstances, can the foreign manufacturer
be liable under § 271(b) for active inducement of infringement?99
According to the two-step framework, the first question is whether the statute
gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially. Section 271(b)
states: “Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
infringer.”100 Thus, on its face, while the statute does not exclude the possibility of
extraterritorial application, it does not affirmatively indicate that it applies to conduct
outside the United States.
In Merial, the Federal Circuit considered it especially significant that § 271(b) did
not, “on its face, foreclose liability for extraterritorial acts that actively induce an act
of direct infringement that occurs within the United States.”101 The Federal Circuit
contrasted the language of § 271(b) with § 271(a), which does require that the acts of

Id.
Id.
97 Id. at 2138 (citing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 267).
98 Id. at 2139-44. Notably, in their dissent, Justices Gorsuch and Breyer did not disagree with the
majority’s analysis of the extraterritoriality issue.
99 The hypothetical fact pattern is similar to that presented in a case tried by the author shortly
before the Supreme Court issued its WesternGeco decision. In Crane Security Technologies, Inc. v.
Rolling Optics AB, D. Mass. Civil Action 1:14-CV-12428, the Swedish defendant manufactured labels
that were alleged to infringe U.S. patents held by the plaintiffs. Some labels were sold in Europe to
consumer products manufacturers who applied the labels to packaging on consumer products that
were then sold in the United States.
100 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2018).
101 Merial, 681 F.3d at 1302.
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infringement occur “within the United States.”102 After Merial was decided, the
Supreme Court changed the nature of the inquiry: the default situation is to exclude
an extraterritorial application unless the statute affirmatively states otherwise.103 In
this instance, the statute plainly makes no affirmative statement about
extraterritorial reach. Because it is silent on the issue, the presumption against
extraterritorial application is not rebutted.
Thus, one must reach the second step in the framework and identify the “focus” of
the statute to determine whether the case involves a permissible domestic application
of the statute.
Here, the focus of § 271(b) is on acts that encourage direct infringement by others
in the United States and also on the state of mind of the one encouraging such acts. In
the hypothetical under consideration, the acts that induce the infringement take place
entirely outside the United States and the actor, whose state of mind must be
evaluated, is also outside the United States. Thus, it seems straightforward that the
hypothetical does not involve a domestic application of § 271(b). Accordingly, the
proposed application of the statute to attach liability for inducing infringement would
be an impermissible extraterritorial exercise.
This conclusion does not change when § 271(b) is read in conjunction with other
provisions. As Justice Thomas indicated in WesternGeco, where the statutory provision
“works in tandem with other provisions, it must be assessed in concert with those other
provisions.”104 Here, one might argue that § 271(b) works in tandem with § 271(a)
because it concerns acts that knowingly encourage direct infringement under § 271(a),
which regulates domestic conduct. But, the conduct that § 271(b) regulates is not the
direct infringement—a separate provision already addresses that wrongful activity—
but instead those independent acts that intentionally encourage such direct
infringement. Thus, the “focus” of § 271(b) is different from § 271(a).
Section 271(b) is also often read in conjunction with § 271(c) because active
inducement was historically considered a form of contributory infringement.105 Several
older district court decisions held that the scope of § 271(c) encompassed
extraterritorial activities.106 However, these cases considered the contributory
infringement provision before it was amended in 1994 to conform with the Uruguay
Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade.107 That amendment made the following changes to the statute:
Whoever sells offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into
the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing
a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the
same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement
Id.
See WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. 2129.
104 WesternGeco, 138 S. Ct. at 2137.
105 Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 761-65.
106 See, e.g., Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Industries, L.P., 899 F.Supp. 1268, 1288
(D.Del.1995) (applying pre–1994 law to the conduct at issue); Engineered Sports Prods. v. Brunswick
Corp., 362 F.Supp. 722, 727 (D. Utah 1973).
107 Urugua Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103–465, title V, § 533(a), Dec. 8, 1994, 108 Stat.
4988.
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of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable
for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.108
These amendments to the Patent Act added “offering to sell” and “importing” as
infringing acts, and the amendments to § 271(c) brought the contributory infringement
provisions into conformance with § 271(a) in that respect. But they also added
territorial limitations that left little doubt that contributory infringement no longer
covered extraterritorial acts.109
Some commentators have inferred from the 1994 amendment to § 271(c) that
Congress must have intended to preserve the extraterritorial reach of § 271(b), since
that provision was left untouched.110 “The absence of a territorial limit is particularly
conspicuous given that § 271(b)’s sister provision, contributory infringement under §
271(c), is expressly limited to acts within the United States. Consequently, as a textual
matter, § 271(b) should be afforded some extraterritorial reach.”111
Whatever might be said of the interplay between §§ 271(b) and (c), however, the
plain language of § 271(b) does not clearly and affirmatively demonstrate an
extraterritorial application.
G. The Enplas case
The Federal Circuit recently considered a case with circumstances quite similar
to those of the hypothetical proposed in the introduction of this paper. Enplas Display
Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Co., Ltd.112 involved patents covering methods of
backlighting display panels used in various electronic devices and related lenses. The
Japanese manufacturer of the panels, Enplas, sold the patented components to
Samsung and LG Electronics, which incorporated them into their flat screen TVs.
Those TVs were then sold in the United States. The court cited Merial for the
proposition that “liability for induced infringement under § 271(b) can be imposed
based on extraterritorial acts, provided that the patentee proves the defendant
possessed the requisite knowledge and specific intent to induce direct infringement in

Id.
See, e.g., Honeywell Intern, 655 F.Supp.2d at 659 n.3 (finding the earlier district court decisions
“no longer applicable because section 271(c) has been amended to only cover conduct ‘within the
United States.’”).
110 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Ten Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of
Petitioner on the Issue of Extraterritoriality at *7-8, Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai
Technologies, Inc., 2014 WL 689554 (2014).
111 Id. See also, Holbrook, Potential Extraterritorial, supra note 68 at n.42; Donald S. Chisum,
Normative and Empirical Territoriality in Intellectual Property: Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J.
INT'L L. 603, 615 (1997) (“Section 271(b) on active inducement remains unchanged as to geographic
scope and patent owners may be able to rely upon it to seek relief against a foreign manufacturer,
even in situations in which the inducing conduct takes the form of the sale of a component. As a
result, the change in section 271(c) may not be of great practical import, but it is curiously inconsistent
with the recent trend to craft intellectual property statutes so as to provide effective relief against
infringing activity originating abroad.”).
112 909 F.3d 398 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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the United States.”113 Enplas had a 50% worldwide market share, “supporting an
inference that Enplas knew of the likelihood that its lenses would end up in the United
States.”114 Enplas also distributed specifications that recommended infringing
configurations to its customers.115 The Federal Circuit found this evidence sufficient to
support a jury verdict of induced infringement.116
After denial of its petition for rehearing, Enplas petitioned for certiorari.117 As
articulated by Enplas, the question presented by its petition is:
Whether, in view of the presumption against extraterritoriality, a foreign
defendant’s foreign sales of components to a foreign company qualifies as
induced infringement, where the defendant knew of, at most, a risk that the
components might be incorporated by third parties into infringing products
that might be sold by other third parties in the United States.118
Enplas focused its petition on the quality of knowledge required to hold a party
liable for active inducement of infringement. It recognized that “§ 271(b) may be better
read to reach only inducing conduct that occurs within the United States” but backed
away from that proposition, asserting that “it is not necessary for the Court to reach
that question to decide this case.”119
Enplas was apparently reluctant to press the broader argument based on its
reading the Court’s decision in Global-Tech. According to Enplas, that decision
implicitly endorsed the view that overseas acts could justify a finding of induced
infringement because “the allegedly inducing acts found sufficient to support liability
in Global-Tech occurred in China.”120 In fact, the record suggests otherwise.
In Global-Tech, the acts of direct infringement by third parties were the sales by
Pentalpha’s customers Sunbeam, Fingerhut and Montgomery Ward.121 Pentalpha’s
behavior allegedly inducing its customers’ direct infringement was its own sales of the
accused deep fryers to those customers,122 but those sales “did not so clearly occur
overseas,” at least not according to the Federal Circuit’s review of the record.123 The
“only evidence” of overseas sales was the delivery of the accused deep fryers f.o.b. Hong
Kong or mainland China, but the Federal Circuit noted that it has rejected such
evidence as dispositive concerning the location of the sale.124 Thus, the Enplas petition
for certiorari appears to concede too much and its argument could well have raised the
more fundamental—and more broadly consequential—issue whether acts of alleged

Enplas, 909 F.3d at 408.
Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 408-09.
117 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Enplas Display Device Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Company,
Ltd., U.S. Supreme Court Docket No. 18-1530 (available at https://tinyurl.com/y5t8ca5x) (last visited
Mar. 12, 2020) (petition denied Nov. 4, 2019).
118 Id. at i.
119 Id. at 15 n. 2.
120 Id. at 14.
121 Global-Tech, 594 F.3d at 1374.
122 Id. at 1367.
123 Id. at 1375.
124 Id.
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inducement outside the United States would constitute an extraterritorial application
of § 271(b).
II. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s test for extraterritoriality, as applied to § 271(b), leaves no
room to hold a foreign defendant liable for acts that occur entirely outside the United
States, even if those acts allegedly encourage a third party to infringe a United States
patent directly through the use, sale, or offer for sale in the United States or
importation into the United States. The contrary decision by the Federal Circuit in
Merial v. Cipla should no longer be followed as it has been overruled by implication by
the Supreme Court’s decision in WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp. Thus,
unless Congress chooses to add an express provision extending the reach of § 271(b) to
activities anywhere, the statute should be interpreted to extend only to domestic
conduct.
Naturally, the current test for extraterritoriality may also have significant
consequences for other sections of the Patent Act. For example, the same reasoning
suggests that the scope of injunctive relief under 35 U.S.C. § 283 should not extend to
activities that take place entirely outside the United States.

